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The paper provides an overview of the regulatory design requirements for new reactors 
addressing Single Failure Criterion (SFC) in accordance to international best-practices, particularly 
considering the SCF relation to in-service testing, maintenance, repair, inspection and monitoring of 
systems, structures and components important to safety. 
The report [1] discusses the detailed comparison of the current SFC requirements and 
guidelines published by the IAEA, WENRA, EUR and nuclear regulators in the United States, 
United Kingdom, Russia, Korea, Japan, China and Finland. However, this paper presents the 
summary of work from [1] and 2major examples from IAEA and WENRA and applications for 
small and modular reactors. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Single Failure Criterion (SFC) ensures reliable performance of safety systems in nuclear 
power plants in response to design basis initiating events. The SFC, basically, requires that the 
system must be capable of performing its task in the presence of any single failure. 
The capability of a system to perform its design function in the presence of a single failure 
could be threatened by a common cause failure such as a fire, flood, or human intervention or by 
any other cause with potential to induce multiple failures. When applied to plant’s response to a 
postulated design-basis initiating event, the SFC usually represents a requirement that particular 
safety system performs its safety functions as designed under the conditions which can include: 
 All failures caused by a single failure; 
 All identifiable but non-detectable failures, including those in the non-tested components; 
 All failures and spurious system actions that cause (or are caused by) the postulated event. 
 
2 OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 
2.1 IAEA application of Single Failure Criteria (SFC) and allowable outage time (AOT) 
 
IAEA, in the major document related to the design of the nuclear power plants (SSR-2/1 as in 
the process of post-Fukushima upgrade [2]), defines under section 5 (General Plant Design) the 
single failure criterion in Requirement 25: 
“The single failure criterion shall be applied to each safety group incorporated in the plant design. 
5.39. Spurious action shall be considered to be one mode of failure when applying the concept to a 
safety group or safety system. 
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5.40. The design shall take due account of the failure of a passive component, unless it has been 
justified in the single failure analysis with a high level of confidence that a failure of that 
component is very unlikely and that its function would remain unaffected by the postulated 
initiating event.” explaining that “the single failure is a failure that results in the loss of capability 
of a system or component to perform its intended safety function(s) and any consequential failure(s) 
that result from it. The single failure criterion is a criterion (or requirement) applied to a system 
such that it must be capable of performing its task in the presence of any single failure.” 
It should be noted that IAEA SSR-2/1 mentions the term “safety group” only in the 
Requirement 25 without definition and that in all other requirements only term “safety system” is 
applied. IAEA Safety Glossary [22] defines a “safety system” as a system important to safety, 
provided to ensure the safe shutdown of the reactor or the residual heat removal from the core, or to 
limit the consequences of anticipated operational occurrences and design basis accidents. Safety 
systems consist of the protection system, the safety actuation systems and the safety system support 
features. Components of safety systems may be provided solely to perform safety functions, or may 
perform safety functions in some plant operational states and non-safety functions in other 
operational states. Furthermore, IAEA Safety Glossary [22] defines a “safety group” as the 
assembly of equipment designated to perform all actions required for a particular postulated 
initiating event to ensure that the limits specified in the design basis for anticipated operational 
occurrences and design basis accidents are not exceeded. Per our understanding of IAEA glossary, 
single “safety system” is designed to perform its single safety function e.g. decay heat removal from 
core while “safety group” covers the few “safety systems” to perform all actions required for a 
particular postulated initiating event (Large Break LOCA).   
Generally, based on the SSR-2/1, IAEA requires application of the single failure criteria 
(SFC) for all safety systems and it is covered by IAEA NS-G guidelines (e.g. NS-G-1.9, Design of 
the Reactor Coolant System and Associated Systems in Nuclear Power Plants or NS-G-1.10 Design 
of Reactor Containment System for Nuclear Power Plants, etc.). Generally, in applicable IAEA NS-
G guides it is discussed that the all evaluations performed for design basis accidents should be made 
using an adequately conservative approach. In a conservative approach, the combination of 
assumptions, computer codes and methods chosen for evaluating the consequences of a postulated 
initiating event should provide reasonable confidence that there is sufficient margin to bound all 
possible The assumption of a single failure in a safety system should be part of the conservative 
approach, as indicated in SSR-2/1. Care should be taken when introducing ad equate conservatism, 
since: 
 For the same event, an approach considered conservative for designing one specific system 
could be non-conservative for another; 
 Making assumptions that are too conservative could lead to the imposition of constraints on 
components that could make them unreliable. 
 
Allowable Outage Time (AOT) 
Under Requirement 28 in SSR-2/1 (Operational limits and conditions for safe operation) it is 
stated that the design shall establish a set of operational limits and conditions for safe operation of 
the nuclear power plant. Para 5.44: The requirements and operational limits and conditions 
established in the design for the nuclear power plant shall include ([3], requirement 6): 
a) Safety limits; 
b) Limiting settings for safety systems; 
c) Limits and conditions for normal operation; 
d) Control system constraints and procedural constraints on process variables and other important 
parameters; 
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e) Requirements for surveillance, maintenance, testing and inspection of the plant to ensure that 
structures, systems and components function as intended in the design, to comply with the 
requirement for optimization by keeping radiation risks as low as reasonably achievable; 
f) Specified operational configurations, including operational restrictions in the event of the 
unavailability of safety systems or safety related systems; 
g) Action statements, including completion times for actions in response deviations from the 
operational limits and conditions. 
Furthermore, Requirement 29 (Calibration, testing, maintenance, repair, replacement 
inspection and monitoring of items important to safety) in para 5.46 requires that where items 
important to safety are planned to be calibrated, tested or maintained during power operation, the 
respective systems shall be designed for performing such tasks with no significant reduction in the 
reliability of performance of the safety functions. Provisions for calibration, testing, maintenance, 
repair, replacement or inspection of items important to safety during shutdown shall be included in 
the design so that such tasks can be performed with no significant reduction in the reliability of 
performance of the safety functions. Para 5.47 provides the alternatives if an item important to 
safety cannot be designed to be capable of being tested, inspected or monitored to the extent 
desirable. Alternatives include a robust technical justification that incorporates the following 
approach: 
(a) Other proven alternative and/or indirect methods such as surveillance testing of reference items 
or use of verified and validated calculational methods shall be specified. 
(b) Conservative safety margins shall be applied or other appropriate precautions shall be taken to 
compensate for possible unanticipated failures 
Additionally to requirements from IAEA SSR-2/1 [2], SSR-2/2 [3]( (IAEA Safety Standard 
Series, SSR-2/2, Safety of Nuclear power Plants: Commissioning and Operations, Rev. 1 in 
preparation, 2014) defines that in, para 4.9, the operational limits and conditions shall include 
requirements for normal operation, including shutdown and outage stages, and shall cover actions to 
be taken and limitations to be observed by the operating personnel. Furthermore, para 4.12 requires 
that the operating organization shall ensure that an appropriate surveillance programme is 
established and implemented to ensure compliance with the operational limits and conditions, and 
that its results are evaluated, recorded and retained. 
IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-2.2 [4] defines the requirements for plant safety limits, limiting 
safety systems settings, surveillance requirements and limits and conditions for normal operations. 
Under section 6 the requirements for the limits and conditions for normal operations are described 
in details. 
Previously, IAEA had a document Safety Series document 50-P-1 (Application of the Single 
Failure Criteria, [8]). This document is outdated but there is still no new IAEA document 
superseded it. However, [8] in section 2 deals with the purpose of the single failure criterion with 
respect to the safety of a nuclear power plant. It also shows where the criterion has its limitations. 
The third section explains the difference between active and passive types of failure and the 
consequences of the failure characteristics for the application of the criterion. Examples are given of 
simple and more sophisticated component redundancy arrangements in a fluid system. The 
possibility of fail-safe designs and the role of auxiliary systems are also dealt with. The following 
section, which is supported by an extensive appendix on various methods to determine allowable 
outage times for redundant components, treats the important case of the reduction of redundancy 
during in-service maintenance and repair actions in operating nuclear power plants. Different 
maintenance strategies are discussed. Section 5 then considers that part of the definition of the 
single failure criterion which states that consequential effects of a single failure are to be considered 
as part of the failure. Section 6 provides an introduction to the problem of common cause failures. 
While the single failure criterion may be satisfied by redundancy of identical components, the 
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common cause failure of such components would nullify this redundancy. Exemptions from the 
application of the criterion are related to failure occurrence probability in Section 7. The 
methodology and the individual steps involved in a single failure analysis (SFA) are explained in 
the last section. A short commentary on the complementary use of probabilistic safety assessment 
(PSA) methods is also given. Permissible outage time in the context of single failure criteria is 
discussed in section 4.1.3. The basic requirements concerning permissible maintenance, test and 
repair times should be considered. They can be summarized as follows: 
(a) If during maintenance, test or repair work, the assumption of a single failure would lead to a 
failure of the safety features; these activities are only permissible within a relatively short period 
without special measures being taken (e.g. replacing the function or rendering its operability 
superfluous). In most cases the time involved in the maintenance, test or repair procedure is so short 
as to preclude any significant reduction of the reliability of the safety feature concerned. Various 
methods (including probabilistic) can be used to determine an admissible outage period. 
(b) If the resultant reliability is such that the safety feature no longer meets the criteria used for 
design and operation, the nuclear power plant shall be shut down or otherwise placed in a safe state 
if the component temporarily out of service cannot be replaced or restored within a specified time 
(stated in the technical specifications). 
(c) Maintenance procedures on safety features over a longer period, during which the component 
concerned is not operable, are only admissible without special measures if in addition to the 
maintenance a single failure can be assumed without preventing the safety feature from fulfilling its 
safety function or if another available system can adequately replace the impaired function. 
(d) Even if the single failure criterion is fulfilled during the maintenance procedure, the time for this 
procedure should be reasonably limited. (e) A PSA can be used to define the maintenance and 
repair times (time from the detection of the failure until the completion of the repair procedure), as 
well as the inspection concept. If this is done, the maintenance procedures should be defined so that 
they do not reduce the reliabilities of the safety features below the value required for the relevant 
PIEs and so that the probabilistic safety criteria, if established, are met. 
Several methods can be used for the determination of permissible outage times. Important 
parameters are the degree of redundancy of the components or systems and the failure rate. The 
final goal is always the performance of a certain safety function, not primarily the availability of a 
particular component. The determination of the required degree of redundancy has to take this into 
account. It allows, therefore, not only for parallel trains of identical configuration but also for other 
systems which could perform the same function. Taking into account the need for reliability of 
safety systems and the desire for high operational availability, some countries consider it necessary 
in ensuring plant safety to require, along with the single failure criterion, additional redundancy for 
some specified safety functions in order to be able to cope with both ongoing maintenance or repair 
work and a simultaneous single failure. This requirement leads to an n + 2 degree of redundancy, 
for example 4 X 50% or 3 X 100% redundancy concepts. Another method used in many countries is 
to increase the redundancy of active components (e.g. pumps, valves) which require the most 
frequent maintenance. This leads in general to a 4 x 50% or a 4 x 100% redundancy concept for 
such components. It should also be noted that some countries as a result of probabilistic 
considerations introduce further equipment in addition to the single failure criterion requirements. 
This increases the level of redundancy of some safety groups required to cope with the relevant 
PIEs. 
The question of common cause failure must also be considered, as described in Section 6 of 
[7]). The advantage of applying these concepts is not only a higher reliability of the safety systems 
but also a higher availability of the plant, because in the event of longer lasting repair activities 
additional measures such as power reduction or plant shutdown are not necessary. The choice 
between the possibilities is then also an economic matter; the investment costs must be compared 
with the anticipated savings connected with the improved availability of the plant. 
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Exception during testing and maintenance - Allowable Outage Time (AOT) 
Detailed methodology for determination the surveillance test intervals and allowed outage 
times (AOT) of systems and components important to safety are not discussed in IAEA guides. 
However, under IAEA SSG-3[6] is discussed that the results of the PSA should be used in 
developing emergency procedures for accidents and to provide inputs into the technical 
specifications of the plant. In particular, the results of the PSA should be used to investigate the 
increase in risk after the removal from service of items of equipment for  testing or maintenance and 
the adequacy of the frequency of surveillance or   testing. The PSA should be used to confirm that 
the allowed outage times do not contribute unduly to risk and to indicate which combinations of 
equipment outages should be avoided. In the chapter „Risk Informed Technical Specifications 
(bullets 10.28 to 10.35) “ it is discussed that The limiting conditions for operation give, for 
example, the requirements  for equipment operability, the allowed outage times and the actions 
required (e.g. the testing requirements for redundant equipment). The allowed outage time for a 
particular system or component is the period of time within which any maintenance or repair 
activity should be completed. If the allowed outage time is exceeded, the technical specifications 
specify the actions that the plant operators should take. For example, if an allowed outage time is 
exceeded during operation at power, the requirement may be for the operators to reduce power or to 
shut down the plant. In addition, the requirements for equipment operability usually include limits 
on the combinations of equipment that can be removed for maintenance at the same time (usually 
referred to as configuration control).  Insights from PSA can be used as an input to justify limiting 
conditions for operation and allowed outage times. Similarly it is discussed also for surveillance test 
periods, etc. Some details about practice of risk based AOT optimization is given in few older 
IAEA-TECDOCs documents [9], [11] and [11]. 
 
 
2.2 WENRA RHWG Safety Reference Levels related to SFC and AOT 
 
A principal aim of the Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) is to 
develop a harmonized approach to nuclear safety within the member countries. One of the first 
major achievements to this end was the publication in 2006 of a set of safety reference levels (RLs) 
for operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) [15] . After the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
accident, they have been further updated to take into account the lessons learned, including the 
insight from the EU stress tests. As a result a new issue on natural hazards was developed and 
significant changes made to several existing issues.  
WENRA Rls cover the 19 areas (01 Issue A:Safety Policy, 02 Issue B:Operating Organisation,03 
Issue C:Management System, 04 Issue D:Training and Authorization of NPP Staff (Jobs with 
Safety Importance), 05 Issue E:Design Basis Envelope for Existing Reactors, 06 Issue F: Design 
Extension of Existing Reactors, 07 Issue G: Safety Classification of Structures, Systems and 
Components, 08 Issue H: Operational Limits and Conditions (OLCs), 09 Issue I: Ageing 
Management, 10 Issue J: System for Investigation of Events and Operational Experience Feedback, 
11 Issue K: Maintenance, In-Service Inspection and Functional Testing, 12 Issue LM: Emergency 
Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Manage-ment Guidelines, 13 Issue N: Contents and 
Updating of Safety Analysis Report (SAR), 14 Issue O: Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA), 15 
Issue P: Periodic Safety Review (PSR), 16 Issue Q: Plant Modifications, 17 Issue R: On-site 
Emergency Preparedness, 18 Issue S: Protection against Internal Fires, 19 Issue T: Natural 
Hazards). 
Single Failure Criterion is considered in several safety reference levels under Design Basis 
Envelope for Existing Reactors (Issue E), as shown below. 
Demonstration of reasonable conservatism and safety margins 
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E8.2 The worst single failure (A failure and any consequential failure(s) shall be postulated to 
occur in any component of a safety function in connection with the initiating event or thereafter at 
the most unfavourable time and configuration.) shall be assumed in the analyses of design basis 
events. However, it is not necessary to assume the failure of a passive component, provided it is 
justified that a failure of that component is very unlikely and its function remains unaffected by the 
PIE. 
Reactor and fuel storage sub-criticality 
E9.7 At least one of the two systems shall, on its own, be capable of quickly rendering the 
nuclear reactor sub critical by an adequate margin from operational states and in de-sign basis 
accidents, on the assumption of a single failure. 
Heat Removal Functions 
E9.9 Means for removing residual heat from the core after shutdown and from spent fuel 
storage, during and after anticipated operational occurrences and design basis acci-dents, shall be 
provided taking into account the assumptions of a single failure and the loss of off-site power. 
Reactor protection system 
E10.7 Redundancy and independence designed into the protection system shall be sufficient at 
least to ensure that: 
• no single failure results in loss of protection function; and 
• the removal from service of any component or channel does not result in loss of the 
necessary minimum redundancy. 
Emergency Power 
E10.11 It shall be ensured that the emergency power supply is able to supply the necessary 
power to systems and components important to safety, in any operational state or in a design basis 
accident, on the assumption of a single failure and the coincidental loss of off-site power. 
 
Alowable Outage Time (AOT) 
The whole Issue H (Operational Limits and Conditions (OLCs)) deals with demonstration of 
OLCs to ensure that plants are operated in accordance with design assumptions and intentions as 
documented in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Among others, reference level H defines the 
unavailability of limits as: 
H6.1 Limits and conditions for normal operation shall include limits on operating parame-
ters, stipulation for minimum amount of operable equipment, actions to be taken by the operating 
staff in the event of deviations from the OLCs and time allowed to complete these actions. 
H6.2 Where operability requirements cannot be met, the actions to bring the plant to a safer 
state shall be specified, and the time allowed to complete the action shall be stated. 
H6.3 Operability requirements shall state for the various modes of normal operation the 
number of systems or components important to safety that should be in operating condition or 
standby condition. 
Also, per H9.1 the licensee shall ensure that an appropriate surveillance program (The 
objectives of the surveillance programme are: to maintain and improve equipment availability, to 
confirm compliance with operational limits and conditions, and to detect and correct any abnormal 
condition before it can give rise to significant consequences for safety. The abnormal conditions 
which are of relevance to the sur-veillance programme include not only deficiencies in SSCs and 
software performance, procedural errors and human errors, but also trends within the accepted 
limits, an analysis of which may indicate that the plant is deviating from the design intent. (NS-G-
2.6 Para 2.11))  is established and implemented to ensure compliance with OLCs and shall ensure 
that results are evaluated and retained. 
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In H10 non-compliances with defined OLCs requires the reports of non-compliance and 
corrective action shall be implemented in order to help prevent such non-compliance (taking into 
account that if the actions taken to correct a deviation from OLCs are not as prescribed, including 
those times when they have not been completed successfully in the allowable outage time, plant 
shall be deemed to have operated in non-compliance with OLCs.)  in future. 
Furthermore, the WENRA RHWG report on safety of new NPP designs [16] discusses some 
considerations based on the major lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, especially 
concerning the design of new nuclear power plants, and how they are covered in the new reactor 
safety objectives and the common positions. The WENRA Objectives O1-O7 covers the following 
areas: O1. Normal operation, abnormal events and prevention of accidents, O2. Accidents without 
core melt, O3. Accidents with core melt, O4. Independence between all levels of Defence-in-Depth, 
O5. Safety and security interfaces, O6. Radiation protection and waste management and O7. 
Leadership and management for safety. 
Within the WENRA Safety Objectives for New Nuclear Power Plants the words “reasonably 
practicable” or “reasonably achievable” are used. In this report the words Reasonably Practi-cable 
are used in terms of reducing risk as low as reasonably practicable or improving safety as far as 
reasonably practicable. The concept of reasonable practicability is directly analogous to the 
ALARA principle applied in radiological protection, but it is broader in that it applies to all aspects 
of nuclear safety. In many cases adopting practices recognized as good practices in the nuclear field 
will be sufficient to show achievement of what is “reasonably practicable”. 
The major change is refined structure of the levels of DiD (Defense in Depth) presented IN 
WENRA RHWG safety objectives for new NPP designs [16]. This document does not change the 
definition and usage of SFC according to WENRA RHWG safety reference levels for existing 
reactors [15] but discusses the some design expectations related to SFC. For example: while the 
postulated single initiating events analyses in combination with the single failure criteria usually 
gives credit on redundancy in design provisions of safety systems and of their support functions, 
addressing multiple failure events emphasizes diversity in the design provisions of the third level of 
DiD. Based on the [16], for DiD level 3.b, analysis methods and boundary conditions, design and 
safety assessment rules may be developed according to a graded approach, also based on 
probabilistic insights. Best estimate methodology and less stringent rules than for level 3.a may be 
applied if appropriately justified. However the maximum tolerable radiological consequences for 
multiple fail-ure events (level 3.b) and for postulated single failure events (level 3.a) are bounded 
by WENRA Objective O2 (accident without core melt). 
Table 1 The refined structure of the levels of DiD proposed by RHWG 
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 (1) Even though no new safety level of defense is suggested, a clear distinction between means and conditions for sub-levels 3.a and 3.b is lined out. The postulated 
multiple failure events are consid-ered as a part of the Design Extension Conditions in IAEA SSR-2/1. 
(2) Associated plant conditions being now considered at DiD level 3 are broader than those for existing reactors as they now include some of the accidents that were 
previously considered as “beyond de-sign” (level 3.b). For level 3.b, analysis methods and boundary conditions, design and safety assessment rules may be developed 
according to a graded approach, also based on probabilistic in-sights. Best estimate methodology and less stringent rules than for level 3.a may be applied if appropriately 
justified. However the maximum tolerable radiological consequences for multiple failure events (level 3.b) and for postulated single failure events (level 3.a) are bounded 
by WENRA Objective O2. 
(3) The task and scope of the additional safety features of level 3.b are to control postulated common cause failure events as outlined in Section 3.3 on “Multiple failure 
events”. An example for an additional safety feature is the additional emergency AC power supply equipment needed for the postulated common cause failure of the 
primary (non-diverse) emergency AC power sources. The task and scope of the complementary safety features of level 4 are outlined in Section 3.4 on “Provisions to 
mitigate core melt and radiological consequences”. An example for a complementary safety feature is the equipment needed to prevent the damage of the containment due 
to combustion of hydrogen released during the core melt accident. 
(4) It should be noted that the tolerated consequences of Level 3.b differ from the requirements con-cerning Design Extension Conditions in IAEA SSR-2/1 that gives a 
common requirement for DEC: “for design extension conditions that cannot be practically eliminated, only protective measures that are of limited scope in terms of area 
and time shall be necessary”. 
(5) Level 5 of DiD is used for emergency preparedness planning purposes. 
The WENRA RHWG safety objectives for new NPP designs[16] does not deal with safety 
demonstration of the SFC. However, it points that the demonstration of physical impossibility, 
based on engineered provisions, can be difficult. Care must be taken to recognize that some claims 
for practical elimination may be based on as-assumptions (e.g. non-destructive testing, inspection) 
and those assumptions need to be acknowledged and addressed. For engineered provisions this can 
be done by excluding the certain feature from the design making further development of accident 
scenario impossible (accident sequence cut-off). 
It should be noted that the level of defense are varying according different international guidelines 
as a basis to develop an evaluation basis for SFC criteria. See Table 2 bellow. 
 
Exception during testing and maintenance - Allowable Outage Time (AOT) 
However, WENRA RHWG safety objectives do not discuss application of the SFC in the 
context of determination of the allowable outage times (AOT) for redundant components. There is 
no recommendation how to treat the the reduction of redundancy during in-service maintenance and 
repair actions in operating nuclear power plants 
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2.3 Level of Depth in Defence (DiD) according different guidelines as a basis to develop an evaluation basis for licensing 




Frequency / yr 
IAEA, SSG-2 [5], 
NOTE 2 
EUR[17] WENRA Note 1 STUK[20],  US-NRC[13] ASME Service 
Levels 
1 f=1 Normal Operation DBC 1,  Normal Operation Normal Operation 
DBC 1, Normal 
Operation Normal Operation A 
2 










DBC 3, Accidents of 
low Frequency 
Design Basis Accidents 
3.a Postulated Single 
Initiating Events 
C 10-2<f<10-4 Design Basis Accidents 
DBC 3, Class 1 
postulated accidents 
10-2<f<10-3 
Design Basis Accidents 
(DBA) (Limiting Faults) 
DBC 4, Class 2 
postulated accidents 
f<10-3 
10-4<f<10-6 Beyond Design Basis Accidents 
DBC 4, Accidents of 
very low Frequency 
Design Basis  Accidents 







10-6>f Severe Accidents 
Complex Sequences 
DEC A for which prevention 
of severe fuel damage in the 
core or in the spent fuel 
storage can be achieved;  
DEC B 
 





DEC B with postulated 






Accident with significant 
release of radioactivity to 
the environment 
 
Note 1: It should be noted that DiD for associated regulation was not assessed toward the initiating event frequency. The presented categorisation was made based on analogy 
with IAEA SSR-2/1. It was generally required that a list of PIEs shall be established to cover all events that could affect the safety of the plant. From this list, a set of anticipated 
operational occurrences and design basis accidents shall be selected using deterministic or probabilistic methods or a combination of both, as well as engineering judgement. The 
 
69-10 
resulting design basis events shall be used to set the boundary conditions according to which the structures, systems and components important to safety shall be designed, in order to 
demonstrate that the necessary safety functions are accomplished and the safety objectives met. 
  
Note 2 Regarding the IAEA SSG-2, please note that it is meant to apply for all the operating reactors in the world and that IAEA tends to come with guidelines which are 
acceptable for all reactor types and and all member states. In comparison to EUR, for example: EUR is meant for new reactors to be built in EU member countries. Furthermore: the 
limit / target of 1E-05 /yr from Canadian REGDOC 2.4.1 (section 8.2.3) is not necessarily directly comparable to the target of 1E-04 /yr in the IAEA's SSG-2 (Table 2). Canadian 
limit relates to "design basis accidents" (DBA). IAEA's target relates to "postulated initiating events" (PIE).  
The "DBA" involves the "PIE" and allows / tolerates a single failure (provided that SFC is applied in the design, which should normally be the case). (For example: design 
basis LOCA followed by a failure of one ECCS train is still a design basis accident, if ECCS was designed according to the SFC.) The probability of a single failure (train level) by 
the "rule of thumb" can be taken as 1E-02 for a train with motor-driven pump, or 1E-01 for a train with a turbine-driven pump. Thus, when the IAEA SSG-2 says that PIE with freq. 
> 1E-04 /yr shall be enveloped by the design basis, it means that any accident sequence with frequency in the range 1E-06 - 1E-05 per year or higher (1E-04 /yr x (0.01 to 0.1)) shall 
produce no consequences larger than design basis consequences (concerning, for example, dose limits).  
Table 2 was created by combining few sources which are not fully comparable but certain analogy was done. For illustration, please see below the original tables from SSG-
2[5] and EUR rev D [17]: 
SSG-2 Deterministic Safety Analyses for Nuclear Power Plants (2009) 
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2.4 SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION APPLICATION IN NEW SMALL REACTOR 
DESIGNS 
 
In tha last decade there was a lot of discussion related to the implementation of so called 
“small rectors” (SR) and “small modular reactors” (SMRs). To establish some context, it may be 
pointed that IAEA provides the following definitions concerning the “sizes” of the reactors: 
 Small-sized reactors: < 300 MW(e) 
 Medium-sized reactors: < 700 MW(e) 
o Upper power limit may change as the current Large-sized reactors are being 
designed for up to 1700 MW(e). 
 
Until recently, several dozens of Design Concepts of SRs and SMRs have been developed in 
Argentina, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, USA, and 
several other IAEA Member States. 
 
According to the definition of its role in the on-going SRs and SMR process, IAEA: 
 Coordinates efforts of Member States to facilitate the development of SRs and SMRs by taking 
a systematic approach to identify key enabling technologies to achieve competitiveness and 
reliable performance of SRs and SMRs, and by addressing common issues to facilitate 
deployment; 
 Establishes and maintains international network with international organizations involved on 
SRs and SMRs activities; 
 Ensures overall coordination of Member States experts by planning and implementing training 
and by facilitating the sharing of information/experience, transfer of knowledge ; 
 Develops international recommendations and guidance on SMRs, focusing on addressing 
specific needs of developing countries. 
 
By definition, SRs and SMRs should have the following advantages: 
 Fitness for smaller electricity grids; 
 Options to match demand growth by incremental capacity increase; 
 Tolerance to grid instabilities; 
 Site flexibility; 
 Other possible advantages; 
 Lower capital cost but perhaps higher capital cost per MWe; 
 Shorter and more reliable construction; 
 Easier financing scheme; 
 Enhanced safety; 
 Reduced complexity in design and human factors; 
 Suitability for process heat application. 
 
IAEA developed the guidance for preparing user requirements documents for small and 
medium rectors and their application [25], although without clear design requirements. It is 
mentioned that the technical requirements should indicate that the design of a given new facility has 
to be in conformance with applicable rules, regulations, codes and technical standards. IAEA-
TECDOC-1451 [26] discusses innovative small and medium sized reactors including, very briefly, 
design features, safety approaches and R&D trends. However, the mentioned document does not 
provide clear information regarding SMRs design requirements and, consequentially, does not 
mention SFC at all. Similarly to IAEA-TECDOC-1451, the IAEA-TECDOC-1485 [27], as well as 
TECDOC-1536 [28], discusses advantages of SMRs design only partially and without specific 
design requirements. 
 
I. Bašić, I. Vrbanić, International Context Regarding Application Of Single Failure Criterion (SCF) For New Reactors, Journal of Energy, vol. 65-2 (2016) 




IAEA report NP-T-2.2 [24] discusses the design features for achieving defence in depth in 10 
different designs of small and medium sized reactors where the part devoted to the application of 
SFC was very limited. In this document there is no mention of SFC as a specific design requirement 
from the IAEA. The latest IAEA documents discussing the advances in small modular reactor 
technology developments, [29], mentions, for the few applications, that the defence in depth (DID) 
concept is based on Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) proposal and 
includes a clarification on multiple failure events, severe accidents, independence between levels, 
the use of the SCRAM system in some DID Level #2 events and the containment in all the 
Protection Levels. The safety systems are duplicated to fulfil the redundancy criteria, and the 
shutdown system is diversified to fulfil regulatory requirements. Application of SFC is not 
discussed at all. 
 
In USA some utilities are considering licensing small modular reactor designs using the 10 
CFR Part 52 combined license (COL) or early site permit (ESP) processes. The U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) expects to receive applications for staff review and approval of 
small modular reactor (SMR)-related 10 CFR Part 52 applications as early as by the end of 2015. 
The NRC has developed its current regulations on the basis of experience gained over the past 40 
years from the design and operation of large light-water reactor (LWR) facilities. Now, to facilitate 
the licensing of new reactor designs that differ from the current generation of large LWR facilities, 
the NRC staff seeks to resolve key safety and licensing issues and develop a regulatory 
infrastructure to support licensing review of these unique reactor designs. Toward that end, the 
NRC staff has identified several potential policy and technical issues associated with licensing of 
small LWR and non-LWR designs. The current status of these issues may be found in the series of 
related Commission documents (http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/advanced.html). The NRC staff has 
also assembled a list of stakeholder position papers identifying stakeholder documents that 
communicate opinions to the staff on technical or policy issues. Additionally, the NRC's Office of 
Nuclear Regulatory Research has engaged in an extensive program focusing on nine key areas of 
anticipatory and confirmatory research in support of licensing reviews for advanced reactors. The 
NRC also interacts with its international regulatory counterparts to share information. In August 
2012, the NRC provided to Congress a requested report (Advanced Reactor Licensing) addressing 
advanced reactor licensing. The report addresses the NRC's overall strategy for, and approach to, 
preparing for the licensing of advanced non-LWR reactors. The report addresses licensing 
applications anticipated over the next two decades, as well as potential licensing activity beyond 
that time. It focuses on the licensing of nuclear reactor facilities for commercial use and illustrates 
regulatory challenges that may occur if various advanced reactor initiatives evolve into licensing 
applications. During 2012, DOE (Department of Energy) instituted an Advanced Reactor Concepts 
Technical Review Panel (TRP) process to evaluate viable reactor concepts from industry and to 
identify R&D needs. TRP members and reactor designers noted the need for a regulatory 
framework for non-light water advanced reactors. The TRP convened in spring 2014 reiterated the 
need for a licensing framework for advanced reactors: 
 10 CFR 50 requires applicants to establish principal design criteria derived from the General 
Design Criteria (GDC) of Appendix A. 
 Since the GDC in Appendix A are specific to light water reactors (LWRs), this requirement 
is especially challenging for potential future licensing applicants pursuing advanced (non-
light water) reactor technologies and designs. 
 NE and NRC representatives agreed in June 2013 to pursue a joint licensing initiative for 
advanced reactors. 
Overall purpose of this initiative is to establish clear guidance for the development of the 
principal design criteria (PDC) that advanced non-LWR developers will be required to include in 
their NRC license applications. 
I. Bašić, I. Vrbanić, International Context Regarding Application Of Single Failure Criterion (SCF) For New Reactors, Journal of Energy, vol. 65-2 (2016) 





In the meantime, while USA NRC was still defining the position related to the licensing 
review of SMRs, the American Nuclear Society (ANS) issued in 2010 the Interim Report of the 
American Nuclear Society President’s Special Committee on Small And Medium Sized Reactor 
(SMR) Generic Licensing Issues [23] which, among other issues, discusses the application of single 
failure criterion (SFC). Report mentions that the current SFC may not be appropriate to 
risk‐informed safety assessments since it defeats the fundamental purpose of a risk analysis, given 
that all components, regardless of safety classification, have the opportunity to fail in a probabilistic 
assessment. SFC can be used to assess the importance of components and structures for design 
improvement, should the consequence be significant, but should not be mandatory. This SFC 
discussion is based on the the rigorous application of risk analysis in a plant design where the 
important design‐basis events can be deduced from the event and fault trees. In addition, safety 
classification of systems, structures, and components can be directly determined from the analysis, 
as can reliability requirements for component performance and the need for inspection, test, and 
surveillance based on component importance. The risk‐informed assessment also allows for explicit 
treatment of uncertainties, which conventional deterministic analysis largely ignores by applying 
“margins” and “conservatisms” intended to bound these unknowns. The risk assessment 
methodology allows for a more transparent understanding of the safety basis of reactors. 
 
Finally, ANS concluded that a key element to development and implementation of innovative 
reactors is the use of a risk‐informed framework, coupled with a demonstration test program upon 
which to issue DCs. Thus, the American Nuclear Society President’s Special Committee on SMR 
Generic Licensing Issues (SMR Special Committee) recommends immediate development of a 
rulemaking to establish a new risk‐informed, technology‐neutral licensing process with a 
license‐by‐test element, to allow innovative designs to be developed and deployed more efficiently 
in the longer term. 
 
None of other regulatory frameworks related to the SFC application discussed in sections 2.1-
2.3 deals with the application of SFC specifically for the SMRs, from which it can be reasonably 
concluded that current regulations for large commercial NPPs (including the SFC application) will 
be in place until new regulations become available. 
 
Canadian regulatory requirements for design of small reactor facilities [30] (RD-367, Design 
of Small Reactor Facilities) defines the “small reactor facility” as a reactor facility containing a 
reactor with a power level of less than approximately 200 megawatts thermal (MWt) that is used for 
research, isotope production, steam generation, electricity production or other applications. For 
reactors with power level above 200MWt Canadian regulatory requirements from REGDOC 2.5.2 
[21] (Design of Reactor Facilities Nuclear Power Plants) are applicable.  Differing to the all other 
regulatory approaches discussed above, Canadian regulatory requirements for design of small 
reactor facilities [30] in section 7.8.2 clearly defines that all safety groups shall be designed to 
function in the presence of a single failure. Each safety group shall perform all safety functions 
required for a PIE in the presence of any single component failure, as well as: 
 all failures caused by that single failure; 
 all identifiable but non-detectable failures, including those in the non-tested components; 
 all failures and spurious system actions that cause (or are caused by) the PIE. 
Each safety group shall be able to perform the required safety functions under the worst 
permissible systems configuration, taking into account such considerations as maintenance, testing, 
inspection and repair, and equipment outage. Analysis of all possible single failures and associated 
consequential failures shall be conducted for each element of each safety group until all safety 
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groups have been considered. Such requirement is similar for the current large commercial nuclear 
power plant. 
 
With above overview and discussion in mind, it is considered recommendable for the CNSC 
to investigate the risk-informed and performance-based alternatives to the single-failure criterion, 
such as those studied and described in [14], in order to identify potential alternative or 
complementary risk-informed approaches with respect to the SFC, for use in the new requirements 
for SMRs. 
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2.5 SFC Summary Table 
 
Table 3 summarizes the approaches discussed in [1] in a limited scope due to the fact that all regulatory requirements related to the AOT and 
associated SFC are not written and defined in the same manner. Nuclear industries (utilities, NPPs, etc.) have developed procedures how to response to 
regulatory requirements and, typically, national regulators accept or refuse proposed application for relaxing the AOTs or SFC. 
Table 3 Summary Table  
Regulatory 
Position 
SFC applied to 
safety group or 
individual 
system 
What systems have to meet 
SFC? 
Is SFC applied 
during planned 
maintenance? 
Is SFC applied 
during a repair 
within AOT? 
Is SFC applied to passive components? Is SFC applied in addition to 
assuming failure of a non-
tested component? 
IAEA Safety system General approach: systems 
which prevent radioactive 
releases in environment.   
Because of different designs,  
system names and description 
it can be related to: 
 Reactor Protection 
System 
 Engineering Safety 
Feature Actuation System 
 Core Decay Heat 
Removal System 
 Emergency Core 
Cooling System 
 Containment decay 
heat removal system 
 Containment 
Isolation System 
 MCR Habitability 
System 
 Emergency AC/DC 
power 




Not discussed directly in regulations. 
The allowable periods of safety 
systems inoperability and the 
cumulative effects of these periods 
should be assessed in order to ensure 
that any increase in risk is kept to 
acceptable levels. 
 
General approach is that the fluid and 
electric systems are considered to be 
designed against an assumed single failure 
if neither  
(1) a single failure of any active 
component (assuming Passive Equipment 
functions properly) nor  
(2) a single failure of a Passive Equipment 
(assuming Active Equipment functions 
properly) results in a loss of capability of 
the system to perform its Safety Functions.  
 
Exemption for passive components exists if 
justification of high standard and quality 
design and maintenance is possible.  
Not discussed directly in 
regulations. 
 
See 4th column on left side.  In 
other words it means that if 
assessment of potential failure 
of any single component 
designed for the function in 
stand-by (non-tested) system 
shows the increase in risks 
above acceptable levels such 
test/maintenance should be 
excluded. 
 
WENRA Safety system 





perform a specific 
function) 
US NRC Safety system 
Finish 
(STUK) 
Safety system Not discussed directly in regulations.  
 
The PRA shall be used to determine the 
surveillance test intervals and allowed 
outage times of systems and 
components important to safety. 
Actually, it is similar with above. 
 
YVL B.1 discusses actually the two 
failure criteria: 
 (N+1) failure criterion shall 
mean that it must be possible to 
perform a safety function even if 
any single component designed for 
the function fails. 
 (N+2) failure criterion shall 
mean that it must be possible to 
YVL B.1 discusses actually the 
two failure criteria as described 







SFC applied to 
safety group or 
individual 
system 
What systems have to meet 
SFC? 
Is SFC applied 
during planned 
maintenance? 
Is SFC applied 
during a repair 
within AOT? 
Is SFC applied to passive components? Is SFC applied in addition to 
assuming failure of a non-
tested component? 
perform a safety function even if 
any single component designed for 
the function fails and any other 
component or part of a redundant 
system – or a component of an 
auxiliary system necessary for its 
operation – is simultaneously out of 
operation due to repair or 
maintenance. 
Some systems need to satisfy criteria 
(N+1) and some (N+2) 
UK Safety system See IAEA, WENRA, EUR, US NRC 
above. 
See IAEA, WENRA, EUR, US 
NRC above. Japan Structure, System 
and Components 
(SSCs) 
Korean  Safety system 
Russian Safety features 
(safety systems 
elements) 




A request for an exception during 
testing and maintenance should be 
supported by a satisfactory reliability 
argument covering the allowable outage 
time 
Actually, similar to text for  
IAEA, WENRA, EUR, US 
NRC above even that section 
7.6.2 of REG-DOC-2.5.2 [21] 
refers to the old IAEA, Safety 
Series No. 50-P-1 [8] which 
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The most important conclusion based on the presented work is that nuclear industry and 
regulation applications either to single failure criteria (SFC) or Defence in Depth (DiD) are not well 
harmonized. A bigger additional effort should be done to establish more strict and harmonized 
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